The Pinochet File

Introduction

On September 11, 1973, years of work by the CIA culminated in the Chilean military overthrowing the country’s democratically elected president, Salvador Allende, and ushering in 17 years of brutal dictatorship by General Augusto Pinochet. This essay explains why and how the CIA staged the 1973 coup.

In order to understand the interplay between the CIA, the Chilean military, and the Chilean government, it is essential to understand the military’s role in a democracy. Government power relies on its control of the military. In established democracies, the military prides itself on being apolitical and following civilian command. In these militaries, power is separated so that no single general could stage a coup. Coups are also seen as very anti-democratic, meaning that individual soldiers and civilians would resist an attempted military coup. However, there are countries like modern Sudan where the military does not follow these practices. These militaries may stage coups or even directly control the economy, politics, and the government. 

By 1970, Chile had had a relatively stable democracy dating back to 1891, with two short-lived military coups in the 1920s and 1930s. After 1932, the country enjoyed nearly four decades of political stability and was regarded as one of the most stable democracies in Latin America. In 1970, under President Nixon’s orders, the CIA began to spend millions of dollars to destabilize Chile and induce its military to stage a coup. This coup finally took place on September 11, 1973 (now often called “the other 9/11”). The coup installed Augusto Pinochet as dictator, who ruled for 17 years, committing large-scale political violence. “It is not a part of American history that we are proud of,” Secretary of State Colin Powell said in 2003 about the morality of the U.S. role in Chile.

As more information came to light about the U.S.’s involvement in bringing Pinochet to power, including investigations into the CIA’s actions by a committee led by Senator Frank Church, public and international outcry against this type of violent action increased (xiv-xv). An internal State Department memo read, “Chile is just the latest example for a lot of people in this country of the United States not being true to its values” (xv). 

Around the turn of the century, the Clinton Administration declassified documents on the U.S.’s role in Chile in response to public demands. The CIA initially resisted declassification, but eventually agreed. The White House stated, “One goal of the [declassification] project is to put the original documents before the public so that it may judge for itself the extent to which U.S. actions undercut the cause of democracy and human rights in Chile.” In 2003, analyst Peter Kornbluh published The Pinochet file, a book that compiles these documents into a comprehensive story of Chile and the CIA. This essay draws from Kornbluh’s book and his primary sources.

1970

Prior to Nixon, presidents had ordered the CIA to undermine governments in Guatemala and Cuba. President Kennedy’s strategy had been to quietly back centrist political parties, which it did successfully for years in Chile (3). When Allende’s left-leaning coalition beat the centrist party, the CIA felt obligated to prevent Allende from taking office, which would have been seen as a failure (6). 

Allende was the first socialist elected in the Western Hemisphere. Future Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ordered a major study on the effect that Allende’s taking office would have. It found there would be “tangible economic losses” and “a definite psychological setback to the U.S.,” but that “the U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile” and that there was no “likely threat to the peace of the region.” It also found that many of the challenges would arise “no matter who becomes Chile’s next president.”

On September 15, 1970, President Nixon ordered the CIA to block Allende from taking office in Chile. Allende had just been elected president in a fair and democratic election, but Congress hadn’t yet ratified him. The CIA operation to prevent his election was codenamed “Project FUBELT,” and from the beginning, its strategy included Nixon’s order to make the economy “scream” (2). The Santiago Station telegrammed, “Carnage could be considerable and prolonged, i.e. civil war…. You have asked us to provoke chaos in Chile… we provide you with formula for chaos which is unlikely to be bloodless. To dissimulate U.S. involvement will clearly be impossible” (1). This was one of just many warnings that Nixon’s advisors gave him, cautioning that a coup would be risky, costly, and probably ineffective. Nixon ignored these warnings.

Initially, the CIA planned to bribe members of the Chilean Congress to block Allende’s ratification. However, they later determined that this was too risky: a single leak would create incredible backlash against the United States (12). 

Over time, the CIA divided its strategy into two possibilities: Track I and Track II, which would both require military force: “Parliamentary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective” (14). Track I would require the cooperation of the current Chilean president, Eduardo Frei. He would replace his cabinet with military figures, appoint an acting president, and then leave the country. However, the CIA was unsure that he would cooperate in overthrowing his own constitutional government: “we have no clear understanding of what we wish Frei to do other than lead the military coup himself, something we can hardly expect of this too gentle soul” (13). 

To spur Frei to overcome his qualms regarding the coup, the CIA planned “to see to it that the Chilean economy, precarious enough since the election, takes a drastic turn for the worse.” In a meeting with a Frei representative, the US Ambassador Edmund Korry threatened, “Not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. We shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chilean to utmost deprivation and poverty” (17). Though Frei did not cave to this pressure, Korry’s warning would later prove prophetic: the US economic blockade of Chile played a central role in the 1973 coup.

In contrast to Track I, Track II would bypass President Frei and go directly to the military. In October, a CIA order read, “Contact the military and let them know the USG wants a military solution” (21). The United States threatened to cut its extensive aid to the Chilean military unless it moved against Allende. The US would even give support to the coup: “High authority in Washington has authorized you to offer material support short of armed intervention to Chilean armed forces in any endeavors they may undertake to prevent the election of Allende on October 24, his inauguration on 4 November, or his subsequent overthrow” (15).

Before supporting Pinochet, the CIA was planning to back other potential instigators such as Roberto Viaux, a military figure of “national stature” who had tried to overthrow Frei in 1969. The Station chief reported that, if given weapons and US support, Viaux was willing to start an insurrection in Santiago, of which “carnage could be considerable and prolonged, i.e. civil war” (22). However, in 1970, these figures either lacked the military authority and power to carry out the coup (like Viaux) or were committed to the constitutional transfer of power (16).

The CIA also incited fear of Allende through “black propaganda,” spreading false but alarming information about Allende to destabilize the country and build support for a coup. For example, the CIA Santiago Station was ordered to plant fictitious reports that Chile’s intelligence services would “be reorganized along the Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating the structure for a police state.” An official stated, “We cannot endeavor to ignite the world if Chile itself is a placid lake” (19). 

Direct references to terrorism were removed from the declassified documents. However, the documents show that the CIA funded and worked with terrorist organizations such as Patria y Libertad and a group led by General Viaux, who they noted “intends to increase the level of terrorism in Santiago over the weekend. The objective of this activity is to provoke the UP into retaliatory violence and public disorder” (20).

As pressure mounted approaching Allende’s inauguration in November, the CIA worked with Vieux and Chilean General Valenzuela to arrange the kidnapping of Commander Schneider. The plan was to kidnap and fly Schneider to Argentina in secret, removing him from his military position and replacing him with an officer who would cooperate with the coup. General Valenzuela would blame the kidnapping on communists, using this as justification for the military coup and to gain public support. The CIA provided $50,000 in payment to Viaux’s forces (the CIA would later forcibly recover this money). On October 22, the CIA delivered six submachine guns and ammunition to the conspirators, and the operation took place later that day. However, instead of taking Schneider alive as planned, the conspirators fatally shot him (28). 

A CIA cable praised the Schneider operation, stating, “The Station has done excellent job of guiding Chileans to point today where a military solution is at least an option for them. COS [and others involved] are commended for accomplishing this under extremely difficult and delicate circumstances” (29). The CIA reported that after Schneider’s shooting, “a coup climate now prevails in Chile” due to political upheaval and the need for the conspirators to complete the overthrow before the Allende government discovered their involvement and brought them to justice. However, contrary to CIA predictions, Chile rallied around its democratic institutions and the Chilean Congress overwhelmingly ratified Allende as president (29). Viaux and Valenzuela were arrested and sentenced to prison, along with many other military officials sympathetic to the CIA’s coup strategy, setting the Agency years back in its plans.

In response to later political fallout around the Schneider assassination, Kissinger attempted to distance the White House from the CIA’s activities. The CIA itself claimed that Viaux was acting independently. However, the declassified documents show that there was a very active chain of information from the White House through the CIA and to the conspirators who organized the operation (33).

Ultimately, neither Track I nor Track II took shape in 1970: Allende was ratified by Congress and became president on November 3rd. When Ambassador Korry said he’d been given “the green light to move in the name of President Nixon… to do all possible short of a Dominican Republic-type action to keep Allende from taking power,” Nixon stated over the phone, “Well, he was—he was instructed to. But he just failed, the son of a bitch. That was his main problem. He should have kept Allende from getting in” (100).

1971-1973

Allende’s election as a socialist was already a blow to the US in the midst of the Cold War. However, Nixon believed that if they sabotaged Chile’s economy and political stability, they could create the impression that socialism was an ineffective form of government. This would theoretically preserve the US’s honor and discourage other countries from moving towards socialism. Nixon stated in November 1970, “Our main concern in Chile is the prospect that he [Allende] can consolidate himself and the picture projected to the world will be his success” (79). The CIA cited “Allende’s superb political performance during the first two months of his administration, and the speed and effectiveness with which the UP has moved to implement the most popular aspects of its program” (90). A CIA cable in 1971 read, “We conceive our mission as one in which we work consciously and deliberately in the direction of a coup” (95). Secretary of State William Rogers declared, “We want to do it right and bring him down” (79).

To economically cripple Chile, Nixon pressured or outright forced international banks, private investors, and corporations to cut off all economic activities in Chile (83). International loans to Chile that totalled hundreds of millions of dollars in the 1960s, like the IDB, World Bank, AID, and US Export-Import Bank, dropped by over 95% (85). Nixon blamed the economic fallout on Allende’s socialist policies (84). 

At the same time, the US tripled its arms sales to Chile’s military to $19 million in order to “maintain maximum contacts” (85). In the Summer of 1971, as the CIA sought out remaining military officers who were sympathetic to carrying out a coup, they were inevitably led to General Augusto Pinochet. The CIA initially described Pinochet as a “mild, friendly, narrow-gauged military man” who was, at the time, a fence-sitter on the coup issue (96). This characterization of Pinochet would turn out to be unbelievably mistaken.

On the political side, the CIA provided millions of dollars for oppositional political parties and propaganda campaigns run by newspapers like El Mercurio (89). The CIA believed that a “coup climate” would arise as Chile declined economically and politically, providing justification for a military takeover. Years later, the CIA stated that its propaganda effort “played a significant role in setting the stage for the military coup of 11 September 1973” (94).

Since Allende was “holding himself out as a moderate,” Kissinger asked, “why not support extremists?” (88). The CIA continued to fund the self-proclaimed neo-fascist terrorist group Patria and Libertad, which, along with a “large segment” of the business community, was “undertaking actions to increase discontent and incidents of violence, especially in the Santiago area, in order to create an atmosphere in Chile which would be propitious for a military coup” (91).

In March 1972, journalists began to discover and publish the CIA’s theoretical plans to sponsor a military coup with the help of the ITT telecommunications company. This severely damaged relations between the US and Chile and led Allende and the Chilean Congress to nationalize ITT (98). In response to public outcry against the CIA, the Church Committee was formed to investigate the CIA’s activities. In October 1972, the CIA and other US departments agreed that, if the Chilean military decided to stage a coup, it would not need the help of the US Government, and no such help should be given (97). However, this decision did not last for long. Meanwhile, CIA and other US officials repeatedly lied under oath and secretly withheld key documents from committee requests. When the Church committee questioned CIA director Richard Helms, he directly lied to cover up CIA attempts to prevent Allende’s election. In 1977, he was indicted for perjury (104). This pattern of subterfuge allowed the CIA and White House administrators to avoid responsibility for their actions and to continue to pursue agendas opposed to the will of the American public.

In 1973, Chile’s parliamentary elections showed increased support for Allende’s party, which picked up 8 seats. This convinced the CIA that their propaganda efforts had failed, ruling out any possibility of impeaching Allende. A military coup was the only remaining option to overthrow the government. The CIA station planned to “induce as much of the military as possible, if not all, to take over and displace the Allende govt.” (106).

The plan of the CIA’s Santiago station involved “large-scale support” to terrorist groups in Chile, “during which time every effort would be made to promote economic chaos, escalate political tensions and induce a climate of desperation in which the PDC and the people generally come to desire military intervention. Ideally, it would succeed in inducing the military to take over the government completely” (107).

In August 1973, a trucker’s strike brought Chile to a standstill, finally bringing about the “coup climate” that the CIA had been working towards since 1970. The last element in the way of a military takeover was Commander in Chief Prats, who was opposed to a coup. In late August, a smear campaign led by the CIA-funded newspaper El Mercurio succeeded in inducing Prats to resign. The Defense Intelligence Agency reported that Prats’s resignation “has removed the main factor mitigating against a coup” (111). A high-ranking CIA agent later explained, “the understanding was that they [the Chilean military] would do it when they were ready and at the final moment tell us it was going to happen” (112). Augusto Pinochet replaced Prats as Commander in Chief and became the leader of the coup plot, positioning him to take control of post-Allende Chile.

As the day of the coup approached, the plotters asked the CIA for assurance that the US Government would give assistance if the coup ran into trouble. High-level state department officials decided that, “if there should be a coop, which might be viewed as favorable but which appears in danger of failure we may want a capability for influencing the situation.” The CIA was tasked to “give this problem attention” (113).

On September 11th, 1973, the coup was completed without the need for direct US military involvement. The military attacked Chile’s White House with tanks, jets, and aerial strafing, killing many of Allende’s guards. The military offered to fly Allende and his family safely out of the country if he surrendered, but Pinochet privately remarked, “that plane will never land.” Allende did not take the offer. At 2:00 pm, Allende was found dead of a gunshot wound, and the radio network announced that Chile was under military control (113).

The coup was met with international condemnation. Many countries suspected the US of playing a role, especially due to their involvement in the coup plots in 1970 that culminated in Schneider’s shooting, along with the leaked plans for a coup between the CIA and ITT. Kissinger responded that the CIA “was in a very minor way involved in 1970 and since then we have absolutely stayed away from any coups.” In contrast, a private report from CIA Director Colby stated that, while the Agency had played no direct role in the military takeover, “U.S. policy has been to maintain maximum covert pressure to prevent the Allende regime’s consolidation” (114). The US Government’s economic blockade of Chile crippled its chances for financial stability. The CIA fostered military sentiments against Allende, used El Mercurio to inflame political tensions, supported extremist groups like Patria y Libertad, and pushed for debilitating strikes. These deliberate moves formed the anarchic “coup climate” that ended with the military’s overthrow of the government. On the day following the coup, Assistant Secretary Kubisch told Kissinger, “Our policy on Allende worked very well.” While Kissinger publicly defended CIA involvement by stating that their only goal was to “strengthen the democratic political parties,” the CIA actually brought down Chilean democracy and made way for the violent dictatorship to come (115).

Pinochet’s Dictatorship

“There will never be an accurate tally of the total deaths,” the CIA said of the immediate aftermath of Pinochet taking power. While Pinochet’s regime reported 244 civilians killed in the coup, the CIA’s own analysis placed this number from 2,000 to 10,000 (161). Pinochet said to US Ambassador Nathanial Davis, “[The Chilean government] is doing its best to prevent violations and the loss of life.” Three days later, Pinochet set in motion a series of massacres that became known as “the Caravan of Death,” a systematic campaign of executing political prisoners without trial, either by stabbing or shooting them (163-64). “Soft” commanders who were against the Caravan of Death were weeded out (165).

One of Pinochet’s primary tools of political violence and control was DINA, the Directorate of National Intelligence. This secret police force arrested and tortured political enemies through electric shocks, beatings, and immersion in vats of urine and excrement to extract information from them. At times, the family members of a prisoner would be sexually abused with the prisoner present (170-171). DINA’s methods were so extreme that members of the Chilean military asked the CIA if they could persuade Pinochet to rein in the torture (173).

During Pinochet’s regime, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s aide briefed him that, “Chile has taken on Spain’s image in the 1940s as a symbol of right-wing tyranny… Like it or not, we are identified with the regime’s origins and hence charged with some responsibility for its actions” (xiv). Yet, despite all of its atrocities, Kissinger remained an avid supporter of Pinochet, privately telling him in 1976, “In the United States, as you know, we are sympathetic with what you are trying to do here… We want to help, not undermine you” (209). Kissinger would remain supportive until the dictator ordered the assassination of two Chilean political rivals in Washington, DC (xiii).

US policy was to “maintain and strengthen” Pinochet’s regime. Kissinger stated, “however unpleasant they act, this government is better for us than Allende was” (211). The US ended its economic blockade of Chile and began providing economic assistance, such as $24 million in agricultural commodity credits (213). In 1975, the Ford administration sent over $112 million to Chile in food, materials, and credits (233). Despite its campaign of torture and murder, DINA leaders were treated remarkably friendly by CIA leaders, and one officer remembers that Stuart Burton and Manuel Contreras went on Sunday picnics together with their families (221-222).

In the end, Kissinger’s attitude towards Pinochet and his crimes was costly to US interests and divided US allies. Rather than being seen as a triumph over communism, the CIA’s actions against Allende’s administration have become one of the clearest examples of the US overstepping its bounds and causing catastrophe. In 1976, in response to human rights abuses, Congress passed an act banning any US military assistance to Pinochet’s Chile. Other acts banned economic assistance to any country showing a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. However, President Gerald Ford largely ignored these acts, and aid to Chile continued.

Conclusion

The Nixon administration authorized the use of $8 million dollars from 1970-73 to make it impossible for Allende to govern. Even more heinously, it incited a military coup to overthrow him. The CIA operation was approved by Henry Kissinger, the Interdepartmental Group, and the Forty Committee. Representative Michael Harrington described Chile as a test case in “using heavy cash payments to bring down a government viewed as antagonistic to the US” (225). CIA activity in Chile must be studied both in order to fully understand the impact that the US has had on the world and to ensure that this impact is positive in the future.

Work Cited

Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet file: a declassified dossier on atrocity and accountability. New Press, 2003.